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WHAT MEANING MEANS FOR SAME AND DIFFERENT: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ANALOGICAL REASONING 
by 
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Under the Direction of David A. Washburn 
ABSTRACT 
 
The acquisition of relational concepts plays an integral role and is assumed to be a 
prerequisite for analogical reasoning. Language and token-trained apes (e.g. Premack, 
1976; Thompson, Oden, and Boysen, 1997) are the only nonhuman animals to succeed in 
solving and completing analogies, thus implicating language as the mechanism enabling 
the phenomenon. In the present study, I examine the role of meaning in the analogical 
reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans, chimpanzees, and rhesus 
monkeys completed relational match-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with either meaningful or 
nonmeaningful stimuli. For human participants, meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition 
of analogical rules. Individual differences were evident amongst the chimpanzees 
suggesting that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. 
Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in either condition, suggesting that their ability to 
reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent upon a dimension other than the 
representational value of stimuli. 
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Introduction 
Conceptual thinking affords us the opportunity to make sense of and to organize 
our environment in such a way that it is more meaningful and far more manageable. We 
are predisposed to organize our field of view into meaningful groups and search for 
similarities among them, thus enabling them to be useful in our everyday lives. Of 
interest to comparative psychologists is the degree to which our nonhuman primate 
relatives posses similar capabilities and find such capabilities helpful in their everyday 
lives. The range of conceptual abilities has been extensively investigated for several 
species of the animal kingdom, including birds (Pepperberg, 1987; Cook, Wright, & 
Kendrick, 1990; Wasserman, Young, & Fagot, 2001; Wright, Rivera, & Katz, 2003), 
dolphins (Herman, Hovancik, Gory, & Bradshaw, 1989), monkeys (Bovet & Vauclair, 
2001; Flemming, Beran, & Washburn, 2005; Katz, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002; Shields, 
Smith, & Washburn, 1997), and apes (Premack, 1976; Thompson & Oden, 1996). But, 
how far are nonhuman animals able to abstract these conceptual abilities in order to apply 
them to novel situations? One reason that such a question is intriguing is that the lower 
levels of conceptual abilities observed in several nonhuman species afford us the unique 
opportunity to examine the continuity of these cognitive processes across humans and 
other animals (Herrnstein, 1990).  
A concept is a set of characteristics shared by all those and only those instances in 
a particular set (Engelmann, 1969).  Concepts provide a means to solve new problems in 
novel situations. Without the ability to think in terms of concepts, we might be 
overwhelmed by the complexity of our environments (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 
1956). Rather than searching for differences between objects that we encounter, concepts 
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serve as instruments for simplifying our surroundings by determining how things are 
alike (Herrnstein, 1990; Pearce, 1994; Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). Numerous 
species including pigeons, monkeys, and humans show an affinity toward identity; these 
species show a great deal of proficiency at matching same, but not different displays 
(Fagot, Wasserman, & Young, 2001; Wasserman, Frank, & Young, 2002 Young and 
Wasserman, 2002). 
Conceptual abilities, like many other cognitive processes, lie on a continuum from 
basic and perceptual to more abstract and even relational. Thomas (1980) proposed a 
hierarchy of learning-intelligence that includes several levels of conceptual ability. 
Levels 1-5 of Thomas’s learning-intelligence hierarchy outline basic habituation, signal 
conditioning (Pavlovian conditioning), stimulus-response (operant) learning, chaining 
(chaining stimulus-response learning units), and concurrent discrimination learning, 
respectively. Level 6 concerns class concepts, the most basic level of conceptual 
representation (Steirn & Thomas, 1990). At this level, objects can be processed together 
because of their perceptual similarities with one another. In addition, more abstract 
mental representations for classes of objects can be created and applied to arrays of 
objects in order to group them together. For example, writing instruments such as pencils 
and computer keyboards may share no physical similarities with one another, but can 
nonetheless be grouped together because they afford the same functionality to the user. 
These concepts can be applied further to relational concepts, also referred to as 
abstract relations (Herrnstein, 1990; Thompson & Oden, 1996) as described in levels 7 
and 8 of Thomas’s (1980) learning-intelligence hierarchy. At these levels, classification 
deals not with the exemplars themselves, but with the relations between and among 
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concepts (i.e., sameness and difference). Rather than attending to discrete physical 
qualities, we can examine the relatedness of one object to another and decide how they 
are related (Premack, 1976; Thompson, 1995). Perhaps the highest order of conceptually 
mediated behavior is the ability to judge relations-between-relations that forms the 
necessary foundation for analogical reasoning, which many regard as the hallmark of 
human reasoning and intelligence (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 
1997; Premack, 1983; Sternberg, 1977). 
Studying Concepts in Nonhuman Animals 
Certainly for nonhuman animals, conveying functional definitions of concepts 
cannot be accomplished through verbal communication. Rather, we must rely on 
nonverbal conceptually mediated behavior.  Just as we teach concepts to children who 
understand spoken language, we require an analog for studying such conceptual abilities 
in nonhuman animals. One way to demonstrate the understanding of a concept is through 
nonlingual overt behaviors. Conceptually mediated behavior is both functionally adaptive 
and cognitively efficient in ways that it permits animals to judge and to adjust their 
behavior to novel objects and events by virtue of membership in an already familiar class 
(Cook et al., 1990; Herrnstein, 1990; Premack, 1983; Wasserman, et al., 2002. By 
making these explicit similarity judgments both between and within common classes of 
objects, animals can convey understanding of conceptual information without the use of 
spoken language. The animal’s behavior can thus be said to reflect their conceptual 
understanding (Pearce, 1994). This said, it is difficult for us to know precisely how 
animals would define their concepts, but certainly not impossible. 
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Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) investigated concept acquisition at varying levels 
of abstraction in three different species: humans, pigeons, and squirrel monkeys. Utilizing 
concepts at three levels of abstraction similar to those described above (Thomas, 1980), 
Roberts and Mazmanian employed a two-choice discrimination task that required animals 
to differentiate one slide from another. Slides were presented two at a time to the animals. 
Animals pressed a key corresponding to one of the slide choices on any given trial. If a 
slide was deemed to be “in-category” selection of it was rewarded with either a light 
(humans), a banana pellet (monkeys), or the brief presentation of a grain hopper 
(pigeons). If the chosen slide was not “in-category” no reward was dispensed. Slides 
were photographs of animals from an assortment of books and magazines. Slides with 
animals contained a wide variety of species including insects, fish, birds, amphibians, 
reptiles, and mammals. A disproportionately larger number of pictures came from the 
bird class, as the basic level discrimination was that of the common kingfisher (Alcedo 
atthis) from other birds. All pictures varied in the viewpoint from which the photograph 
was taken, as well as coloring, number of animals in the picture, and proportion of animal 
to background area. The pictures not containing animals included a variety of indoor and 
outdoor scenes with trees, flowers, mountains, foods, clothing, airplanes, and houses. 
After 30 sessions of training with one set of slides, eight days of transfer testing with 
probe stimuli were conducted. 
Humans, not surprisingly, were able to acquire concepts at the basic, low-
abstraction, as well as the high-abstraction levels. Humans correctly chose the “in-
category” slides with around 90% accuracy for all three levels. Monkeys and pigeons, 
however, were less successful at certain levels of abstraction. Monkeys were significantly 
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better at making the discriminations at low (kingfisher vs. other bird) and high (animal 
vs. nonanimal) levels.  Pigeons only successfully acquired the most basic concept: they 
discriminated only kingfishers from nonkingfishers.  All three species appeared to have 
formed the kingfisher concept. When the problem was made more abstract by requiring 
subjects to identify birds in general, or animals in general, the category may have become 
too broad or abstract for the subjects to learn a simple rule for identification for 
identifying individual exemplars (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988).  These findings support 
the theory that animals learn concepts by responding to a small set of features in pictures 
that look similar (Premack, 1983; Zentall et al., 2002). 
When studying concept formation and acquisition in our own species, we can 
simply ask participants about the rules they used in order to perform successfully, 
although research shows that these self-reports may not be veridical (Gentner & 
Markman 1997). However, one can be successful at some categorization tasks without 
ever acquiring a concept that is defined in the same way as it may be by the majority of 
humans. In an experiment by Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith, and Lawson (1980) 
chimpanzees were required to sort a mixed pile of tools and food into two separate piles 
based on these categories. Apes were trained with a small set of objects and were 
successfully able to sort new, but familiar, objects during test trials. It is not easy to argue 
that this problem was solved on the basis of physical similarity of the test items to the 
training items, because it is difficult to identify a set of physical features that an object 
must possess in order to be classified as a tool or as food. Instead, these objects may have 
been categorized successfully because the subject possessed the concepts “food” and 
“tool.” Conversely, these objects may not have been categorized utilizing the same 
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meaning to the concepts that we might have. For instance, the chimpanzees may use just 
one concept of “food/edible” meaning to them “something I would or have in the past 
eaten” and “not food/inedible” for the tools. This type of sorting does not prove that the 
animals have indeed acquired a “tool” concept. Although we could be using the same 
strategy with similar names for the concepts that differentiate the classes of objects, we 
tend also to devise a unique and more specific concept for sets of objects that describe 
how they are related to each other, rather than simply how they are unlike those objects 
that fall under another concept (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980). 
Like chimpanzees sorting slides into tool and. food groups, capuchin monkeys 
have proven proficient at sorting pictures into person/nonperson groups. In the case of 
capuchin monkeys sorting photos based on the “person” concept (D’Amato & Van Sant, 
1988), categorization may mimic how humans view the person concept. D’Amato and 
Van Sant trained capuchin monkeys to categorize photographs based on the “human” 
concept. Monkeys discriminated between slides containing humans from those not 
containing human figures. Although monkeys were successful on the task, D’Amato and 
Van Sant found several interesting errors by analyzing individual test trials. Any 
nonperson slide that contained a red patch (i.e., other animals or fruits) was more likely to 
be classified as belonging to the person category. It is therefore possible that a “red 
patch” was a feature that the monkeys determined sufficient for responding and that it 
acquired considerable associative strength, presumably because it is common to many 
faces and resulted in a high level of responding whenever it was presented. The primary 
way we know that humans use a true “person” concept rather than a “red patch” concept 
is by asking them. 
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Bovet and Vauclair (2001) similarly investigated abstract concept formation in 
baboons. Food and nonfood objects were presented to the monkeys with a modified 
Wisconsin General Test Apparatus (WGTA).  Baboons were trained to pull one of two 
ropes corresponding to same or different (S/D) in response to the relation between the 
two objects presented.  If both objects presented were from the same category 
(food/nonfood), pulling the rope corresponding to same was the correct response. When 
one food and one nonfood were presented simultaneously, pulling the different rope was 
the correct response. Although the authors suggested that success on the part of the 
monkeys to complete the task was adequate demonstration of judgment of conceptual 
identity, the results do not imply any sense of relational matching.  Making one response 
for two food objects versus one food and one nonfood does not imply that the monkeys 
have any S/D concept. Rather than implying conceptual labels, the response ropes could 
simply symbolize presence or absence of food.  
Relational Discriminations 
Just as basic concepts act as simplifiers of our world by allowing us to group 
objects into categories, abstract concepts provide a means to extend this function beyond 
physical or functional similarities (Pearce, 1994).  Subjects can choose between 
discriminative stimuli based not only on absolute physical properties, but also on 
relations between those stimuli that are presented. 
Kinnaman (1902) was one of the first to recognize the distinction between types 
of discrimination, suggesting that alternative strategies exist to individuals solving these 
kinds of tasks. They may rely more on the relative than the absolute properties of the 
stimuli. For example, when given a choice between a 4 cm tall box and a 1 cm tall box, a 
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subject may first begin choosing under the assumption that the rule is to choose the 4 cm 
tall box (based on absolute size). However, when more examples are given, it becomes 
apparent that absolute size is not the rule under which the paradigm operates. Rather, one 
must compare the two boxes presented and choose the larger of the pair (relative size), 
whether it is 1 cm or 4 cm tall. That is, the object that is larger relative to the other object. 
Kirkpatrick-Steger and Wasserman (2000) investigated pigeon’s abilities to 
discriminate among stimuli using relative information of shape and location.  Pigeons 
were trained to peck a pairs of shapes that were arranged in one of several different 
configurations in relation to each other. Some items were, for example, “to the right of” 
or “on top of” the second item of the pair. Rather than attending to the specific shapes 
included in the sample, pigeons were required on some trials to attend specifically to the 
relation of one object relative to the other.  Whereas some pigeons were unable to 
overcome the salience of shape, others succeeded in learning relative configural rules. 
Analogical Reasoning 
Analogical reasoning, Halford and Graeme (1992) argued, is the mechanism that 
allows for all conceptual thinking, including logical inference. Knowledge about 
analogies forces explicit expression of conceptual knowledge, unlike simple 
discriminations that may rely on more implicit types of conceptual knowledge (Premack, 
1986). In an analogy, a relationship must be established between the first two elements in 
the series.  Then, and only then, can one continue to the second set of elements and seek 
the same relation between them. By discriminating between two abstract relations, one is 
able to acquire the knowledge needed to complete and construct analogies, much like the 
chimpanzee, Sarah (Premack, 1983). Sarah was given a variety of analogical reasoning 
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problems using arrays of meaningful plastic chips of different colors and shapes. Two 
tangible plastic objects that varied on one dimension (i.e., color, shape, or size) were 
placed to the left of a center chip which signified same.  To the right of the same symbol 
was placed only one object. The task thus required the chimpanzee to perceive the 
relationship between the shapes on the left and recreate its analog to the right of the 
center chip. Not only was Sarah able to complete the task with flat geometric shapes, but 
she was also successful when the items presented were everyday three-dimensional 
objects (Gillan, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981).  
Along the primate lineage, species more closely related to humans have many 
common cognitive abilities, including the capacity for judging relations-between-
relations through the further application of conceptual knowledge. Many ape species, 
including humans, are therefore considered “analogical” because of their adept ability to 
represent the world propositionally. The fundamental distinction between monkeys and 
apes is in their explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys accept identity based upon 
identical features, whereas humans (and other ape species) accept it on the basis of 
identical subject matter. Monkeys, therefore, can be thought of as “paleo-logicians” in 
the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of common 
physical features. This is not because monkeys do not represent their world, but rather 
because they appear not to represent it propositionally (Thompson & Oden, 2000). Rather 
than recalling representations of the meaning expressed in what they see, monkeys tend 
to represent their environments exactly as they are expressed. 
Some abstract relations can be visually perceived at some level and are 
subsequently easier to process. Abstract perceptual relations can be visualized, but 
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require some level of abstract conceptualization, possibly at a lesser degree, compared to 
other abstract relations.  Fortes, Merchant, and Georgopoulos (2004) investigated spatial 
judgments in animals by evaluating the ways in which the rhesus monkey acquired the 
concepts of high and low. Differentiating between high and low is a rather easy task for 
human adults. In a delayed matching-to-sample task, a rhesus monkey determined 
whether lines on a computer screen should be categorized as high or low.  Beginning with 
the extremes (top and bottom) of the computer monitor, bars were displayed at varying 
heights. After each bar was presented for one second, choice stimuli appeared (similar 
bars at the extreme top and bottom of the screen) allowing the monkey to respond high or 
low.  Throughout a testing session, bars varied in height, with many hovering around the 
midline of the screen. As for humans, these bars proved more difficult to classify by the 
monkey. The monkey was able to generate an abstract notion of a midline in a fashion 
similar to adult humans. This evidence supports the notion that nonhuman primates can 
generate an abstract perceptual concept.  
In addition to examining the absolute acquisition of such concepts, Fortes, 
Merchant, and Georgopoulos (2004) sought to determine how the concepts are 
represented in nonhuman animals. In humans, similar concepts may be represented either 
semantically, or by an analog comparison model. One way that this can be examined is 
by the existence of the congruity effect. The congruity effect occurs when there is a 
decrease in the response time when the objects compared are closer to the category pole. 
In this instance, when bars are closer to the midline, response time may increase. Upon 
determination of the existence of the congruity effect in the rhesus monkey, an analog 
comparison is more likely to be favored by nonhuman animals (Fortes et al., 2004). 
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Same and Different 
The judgment of same versus different (S/D) is such an exceedingly 
straightforward one for humans that it often becomes difficult to make comparisons and 
describe events without these words. For this reason, Premack and Premack (2003) called 
same and different “early concepts”. When making comparisons between objects or 
events in the world, the same-different distinction is many times our first approach, 
conveying the most useful information (Premack, 1976).  Responding differentially to 
groups of same or different items seems an almost trivial task. For humans, however, the 
S/D rule of discrimination is one that we have come to rely on, and tend to use readily.  
Making relational judgments, although simple and obvious to adult humans, may not be a 
simple and obvious default rule for discrimination groups of objects for other species 
(Premack & Premack, 2003). 
Whereas it is often difficult to describe relations without using the words same 
and different, the abstract concepts have no linguistic prerequisites (Premack, 1976).  The 
words can be applied to objects that themselves do not have names. In addition, when 
using relation-level problem solving, the name of the objects is irrelevant. Rather, the 
relation between the objects is the only relevant information. In relational matching tasks, 
an individual must abandon ordinary matching entirely and move to a different level of 
problem solving--the relational level (Premack & Premack, 2003). To complete a 
relational match-to-sample successfully, participants must direct questioning to “what is 
the relationship between the members of each pair?” Labeling of the pairs is the 
necessary component to any relational match-to-sample task. So, participants must match 
self-given labels of pairs rather than the pairs themselves.  Dependence on labels brings 
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to the forefront the question of whether language may be necessary to make judgments of 
relations between relations (Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997).  Can we sufficiently 
label objects without language? If the answer to this question is “no,” then we should not 
be surprised by Premack’s suggestion that participants, human or nonhuman, cannot 
complete a relational matching task without extensive language training. However, if 
effective labeling for relational information can be accomplished without language per 
se, then we should expect language-naïve nonhuman species also to succeed on tasks 
requiring analogical thinking. 
Throughout recent years, several studies have indicated that Premack might have 
been right: language training is necessary when relational problem-solving skills are 
required (Shyan & Wright, 1993; Thompson & Oden, 1996 Wright & Santiago, 1984). 
Related research shows, however, that nonhuman animals such as pigeons and monkeys 
possess implicit knowledge of the concepts of same and different, no matter how limited 
and different from our own knowledge of the concepts (Fagot et al., 2001; Wasserman et 
al., 2002; Wright et al., 2003). 
Two types of studies comprise a majority of the S/D concept literature: 
acquisition of the concepts themselves and their application to the judgment of abstract 
relations. To determine the acquisition of the concepts themselves, subjects typically 
need only to respond differentially to groupings of exemplars that are either all identical 
or all different. When applying the judgments to abstract relations, subjects often must 
use the concepts as the basis for their future behavior and match one set of exemplars to 
another set on the basis that the relation is the same for the sets. 
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The matching concept itself is abstract (Wright, 1997). It is abstract because it 
transcends the stimuli used to train it and is distinct from “natural” concepts which are 
categories unified by some specific stimulus attribute or attributes. In the traditional 
match-to-sample paradigm, pigeons (Wright, 1997) and rhesus monkeys (Washburn, 
Rumbaugh, & Richardson, 1992; Washburn & Astur, 1998) were capable of responding 
on the basis of the simple if/then statement: “if sample equals A, then choose A not B.” 
However, when tested on novel stimuli in transfer tests, pigeons often failed the task. 
They had learned the configural patterns necessary for performance on training tests, but 
had not truly learned the concept necessary to succeed on transfer tests. That is, they do 
not typically learn the matching concept. The reason that pigeons may learn configural 
patterns instead of abstract concepts may reflect their learning predisposition (Wright, 
1997). Concept learning requires that subjects learn to relate one stimulus to another – to 
relate each comparison stimulus to the sample stimulus. 
Cook, Katz, and Cavoto (1997) examined the acquisition of the S/D concepts 
through the use of a two-choice discrimination task by pigeons.  Birds were presented 
displays from four distinct domains classified as either the same or different: texture, 
feature, geometric, and object. The use of four different display types was integral in 
determining whether the birds truly acquired the concepts of same and different as we 
understand them so that they can be universally applied across different domains.  Same 
displays consisted of the repetition of a single element throughout a 24 x 6 array. In the 
different displays, an 8 x 7 region of contrasting elements (differing in either shape or 
color) was randomly located within the larger array. Texture displays appeared uniform, 
with the exception of a nonidentical patch of simulated texture for different displays. 
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Geometric patters were arrays approximately six of the same geometric object, or arrays 
of five of the same and one odd object. Object displays were patterned in the same 
fashion, but were made of actual clipart pictures rather than simple geometric objects. 
Pigeons were tested on all four types of displays presented on a computer monitor.  After 
50 sessions of testing concurrently across all display types, pigeons had readily learned a 
same-different discrimination.  The rate and general pattern of responding was 
approximately the same for all types of displays, lending support that the concepts are 
applied identically across different domains. A single generalized rule was most likely 
used to discriminate all display types. These results provided some of the first strong 
evidences that pigeons, like many primates, can learn and abstract, visually mediated S/D 
concept (Cook et al., 1997). 
 Shields, Smith, and Washburn (1997) presented monkeys with a S/D task in 
which the discrimination required was between boxes containing various amounts of 
pixilation.  The main goal of this study was to examine the uncertainty response as it 
applies to judgments of same versus different. Pairs of pixel boxes were presented on a 
computer screen with a star (a previously used symbol for escape) and a “D.” If the pixel 
boxes matched in their amount of pixilation (i.e. their “sparseness” or “denseness”), the 
correct choice was to move the cursor in contact with the box pair. If the boxes were 
illuminated with different amounts of pixels, choosing “D” was correct. As the density 
ratio between the two boxes approached 1.0, the same-different distinction became 
increasingly different, leading to a choice of the star to escape the trial.  This evidence 
supports the notion that monkeys may understand the S/D distinction along a continuum.  
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After several training sessions, monkeys discriminated between same and different 
relations with a great deal of accuracy.   
Identity and Nonidentity 
Researchers have demonstrated that nonhuman animals can learn to discriminate 
large arrays in which all of the items are physically identical or nonidentical to each other 
(Wasserman et al., 2001).  That is, they can detect perceptual similarities and differences. 
Evidence is insufficient, however, to suggest that their concepts of sameness and 
difference operate in a way that is congruous to our own.  One caveat to the above 
mentioned studies is that the animals are unable to make such distinctions when the 
arrays contain fewer than 6-8 items, suggesting that subjects are actually relying on 
variability or entropy in order to succeed at the task.  Rather than recalling a 
representation of difference, animals may be perceiving the amount of perceptual 
variance or regularity to be greater in the different arrays than in the same arrays (Fagot et 
al., 2001).  When the number of items displayed decreases, we observe depreciation in 
the animals’ ability to discriminate.  
Entropy: Same vs. Different? 
In a series of experiments with pigeons (Young & Wasserman, 1997) the effects 
of number of items in a given display as it relates to the rate of concept acquisition was 
investigated. After several animal species were shown to fail on tasks involving the 
categorization of just two visual items as the same or different (Santiago and Wright, 
1984), Wasserman and colleagues devised a task that would make these types of tasks 
easier. Perhaps, they reasoned, there is simply not enough information in a two-item 
display to convey the concepts of sameness and difference. For this reason, Wasserman’s 
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studies typically introduce animals to arrays of 16 or more items for discrimination (see 
Figure 1). 
The notion of entropy describes the phenomena that might occur when success in 
these types of paradigms is contingent upon the number of items in a display.  Entropy is 
described as the amount of change or variability that is perceived within a grouping of 
items. This idea was put forth by Shannon and Weaver (1949). To compute entropy one 
can use the following equation, where H(A) is the entropy of a categorical variable A, a is 
a category of A, and pa is the proportion of observed values within that category: 
H(A) = - Σ pa log2 pa
Thus, in a 16-item array of all identical items, entropy is independent of the number of 
items: entropy = 0 (for any set of identical items). Changing the number of exemplars in 
the sample display should not change the amount of pictured variability. For different 
displays, however, reducing the number of items in the sample would reduce the amount 
of pictured variability. With only two pictured items, the variability of different sample 
displays (entropy = 1) is numerically closer to 16-item same samples (entropy = 0) than it 
is to 16-item different samples (entropy = 4). 
Pigeons proved successful in transferring their knowledge to novel stimuli, 
lending support that S/D concepts were truly formed. In addition, both species were 
strongly controlled by the entropy of sample displays. Both humans and baboons used the 
entropy of the sample to guide their choice behavior. 
However, the key distinction between the species is where they set the entropy 
cutoff for these displays. It appears that humans set that cutoff near 0, whereas baboons 
set that cutoff near the midpoint range of the entropy scores, here approximately 2. 
 17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Entropy-Infused Displays Presented to Pigeons in Wasserman, Young, and 
Peissig, (2002).  
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Following the finding that baboons could also successfully differentiate between 
S/D 16-icon displays (Wasserman et al., 2001 in a two-choice task, discrimination of 
second order relations was examined. Fagot, Wasserman, and Young (2001) investigated 
whether baboons could discriminate same from different using their abilities to judge 
relations-between-relations in a delayed relational match-to-sample task (RMTS). For 
comparison purposes, adult humans were also required to complete the same task. 16-
icon arrays were again used as stimuli, but were presented in the MTS format. One array 
appeared on the computer screen as the sample array, followed by a small delay and the 
presentation of two choice arrays, only one of the choice arrays being of the same 
relational type as the sample. Two baboons successfully learned the RMTS. That is, they 
accurately picked the choice display that involved the same relation among the 16 icons 
(same or different) as in the sample display. The acquisition of RMTS for baboons was 
comparatively slow. In the final four sessions after approximately 6,000 trials, baboons 
averaged 84% correct. In addition, success on same trials was acquired at a more rapid 
rate. In comparison, humans were approximately 100% accurate on both stimulus types 
within the first 100 trials. After continued training, it was determined that given enough 
trials (more than 10,000), one baboon successfully discriminated (81% correct) S/D 
displays of only 3 items.  
In a second experiment, Wasserman, Young, and Fagot (2001) compared the 
effects of number of icons between species. As in previous studies, performance on the 
delayed MTS task dropped sharply if the number of icons in the display was reduced 
below 8 items (after which performance did not exceed 63%). In contrast, display set size 
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had no effect on adult human participants. Performance did not diminish as set size 
decreased for humans as it did for baboons. 
Rather than training and requiring subjects to respond to abstract conceptual 
stimuli in order to obtain reward, implicit discriminations enable us to examine how 
animals may be predisposed to process stimuli.  Wasserman, Frank, and Young (2002) 
asked whether pigeons might exhibit relational stimulus control that did not explicitly 
require S/D discrimination. As in previous experiments (Fagot et al., 2001; Wasserman et 
al., 2001), pigeons viewed arrays of icons that were either all the same as each other or all 
different from each other. In addition, arrays were composed of icons from one of two 
sets, creating four distinct array types: different-1, different-2, same-1, and same-2. 
Different-1 and same-1 arrays contained icons from the same library, but never from icon 
set 2. One of the four types of arrays was designated as the S+, associated with reward. 
The other three, however, were not.  On any given trial, only one type of array was 
displayed at a time. Pecks to the S+ displays delivered food regardless of whether the 
pigeons also pecked the S- stimuli. Each pigeon was therefore free to respond as it chose, 
with different patterns of responding to the four kinds of discriminative stimuli allocating 
attention in one of four ways: icon set alone, relation among the icons alone, both 
properties, or neither of the properties of the displays. In training trials, all four stimulus 
types were rewarded, while in discrimination trials, only one types of array was 
designated the S+.  The authors argued, consistent with Goldstone and Barsalou (1998), 
that it may be more appropriate to view the task as falling somewhere on a perceptual-
conceptual continuum. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) stated that many phenomena we 
view as conceptual actually may be the result of perceptual processes becoming “less 
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bound to the perceptual specifics” (p. 256) of the stimuli.  Therefore, the degree to which 
a process is conceptual is dependent upon the degree to which it is free of perceptual 
details (Wasserman, et al., 2002). 
An interesting find from their previous study (Fagot et al., 2001) was a difference 
in the acquisition rates of the S/D concept for baboons. Criterion for same trials was 
attained more quickly than different.  By varying the amount of variation in stimulus 
displays, Young and Wasserman (2002) examined properties that seem to make 
uniformity special.  Entropy, the amount of variation within a display, is known to play 
an important role in the acquisition of abstract concepts. Pigeons as well as baboons and 
rhesus monkeys seem to have trouble detecting variety when a set consists of fewer than 
8 items. By varying the number of distinct items within a different array, entropy is 
altered. For example, a 16-item array with all 16 distinct items (akin to those displays 
used in all previous Wasserman studies) has an entropy level of 4. However, a 16-item 
array with only 8 distinct items (each duplicated once) has an entropy of only 2.   
In this study, Young and Wasserman (2002) evaluated the extent to which a 
display is classified as different based on how different it really is. Pigeon and adult 
human participants made S/D discriminations between displays while the arrays to be 
compared were not of equivalent entropy. Entropy varied from 0 (16 all identical) to 4 
(16 all distinct) in increments of 0.5. When discrimination involved comparing a different 
array of entropy 4 to one of lesser entropy, S/D accuracy decreased with increased 
entropy. Along the entropy continuum, displays were discriminated asymmetrically: 
values at the lower end of the entropy scale were much more easily distinguished than 
those at the upper end of the scale. It was easier for both humans and pigeons (although 
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to a slightly lesser extent) to discriminate an entropy = 0 display from those with higher 
entropy than to discriminate an entropy = 4 display from those with lower entropy. When 
even a small amount of variability is introduced into a display, it becomes significantly 
more difficult to discriminate. These findings suggest that uniformity is saliently different 
from higher levels of entropy.  
Critical Factors in Learning the S/D Distinction 
In contrast to entropy-related studies in which the number of items simultaneously 
presented served as a critical factor, Katz, Wright, and Bachevalier (2002) identified 
training stimulus set size as crucial to S/D abstract concept learning by rhesus monkeys. 
An increased set size has the advantage of drawing attention from aspects of individual 
exemplars and placing emphasis on the relation between them. With small set sizes, 
individual features of objects may become the controlling cue, whereas in large stimulus 
sets individual features change frequently enough that stimulus relationships such as the 
S/D distinction are able to emerge as the basis for further discrimination (Katz et al., 
2002). Further, with larger set sizes, issues of proactive interference are a more minimal 
factor. If the present stimulus is unique in the learning history of the animal, previous 
associations with that stimulus cannot be recalled. Katz and colleagues. (2002) found that 
an increase in training set size is associated with a decrease in the number of trials to 
criterion for rhesus monkeys. In addition, with larger set sizes, higher levels of accuracy 
were achieved. 
After being trained on a two-choice S/D discrimination task using a set size of 
only 8 photographic stimuli, animals began a transfer test with novel sets of stimuli. New 
sets contained between 8 and 128 unique stimuli. All animals completed transfer tests 
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stimuli sets of several different sizes.  As set size increased, the number of trials to 
criterion decreased. The more exemplars contained in the stimuli set, the more quickly 
the same/different distinction was made. However, for sets above 32 exemplars, animals 
all performed significantly above chance after only approximately 100 trials. Rather than 
being an “all-or-nothing” phenomenon, abstract concept learning may rely heavily on 
larger set sizes. Abstract conceptual learning with significantly smaller stimulus sets may 
never emerge, whereas an abundance of exemplars help animals to break free from a 
predisposition to item-specific learning (Katz et al., 2002). 
Capuchin monkeys were presented with a task similar to that completed by rhesus 
monkeys in previous experiments (Katz et al., 2002). As set size increased, transfer 
performance also increased. However, capuchin monkeys learned the S/D task and 
abstract concepts much more rapidly than rhesus monkeys trained in the same procedure. 
Capuchins tended to learn the task in one-fifth the amount of transfer sessions as rhesus 
monkeys.  
Whereas Fagot and colleagues (2001) have demonstrated that at least two 
baboons would have marked difficulty on a relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task, 
rhesus monkeys at the Language Research Center (LRC) with extensive testing 
experience were presented with the task in order to verify these results with trial-unique 
stimuli (Flemming et al., 2005). In an experiment motivated by the views of Washburn, 
Thomspon, and Oden (1997), pairs of images were used as stimuli in a matching-to-
sample task. One stimulus pair (composed either of two identical or two different trial-
unique randomly drawn images) served as the sample. After contact was made with this 
object (via a cursor controlled by a joystick), choice pairs were presented on each side of 
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the bottom half of the screen. One choice pair was composed of two identical images (but 
different from any of those present in the sample pair) and the other was made of two 
images that differed physically from each other.  Monkeys were required to choose the 
pair which matched the same relation (either same or different) of the sample pair. After 
verifying that monkeys fail on such a task, several other steps were taken to determine 
why they failed and whether they could be trained to succeed in such a task. 
A series of experiments was designed beginning with the most basic of 
discriminations: a two-choice paradigm (Flemming et al., 2005). Throughout the course 
of the experiments, several conclusions could be made about the acquisition of concepts 
by rhesus monkeys: implicitly, their concepts for same and different may be better 
described as uniformity and chaos, respectively, increasing the entropy of a display acts 
as a means to learn said concepts, and discriminative cues are integral for proficient 
success. In Experiments 1 and 2, we found that pairs of images may present a unique 
problem for the monkeys. In a simple two-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys 
completed over 10,000 trials with chance levels of accuracy. Paired images were spread 
farther apart by space and separated with lines (see Figure 2). However, side biases 
revealed that all five monkeys had no particular strategy with which to solve the task. 
From this, we concluded that the monkeys may not have perceived the pairs as such. That 
is, they were seeing the pair of images as one stimulus “bunch” rather than a pair of two 
identical or nonidentical images. 
In Experiment 3, groups of eight identical and nonidentical stimuli were presented 
in place of pairs (see Figure 3). Monkeys quickly learned their assigned S+.  
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Figure 2. Paired-Image Displays Presented to Rhesus Monkeys in Experiment 2 of 
Flemming, Beran, and Washburn, 2005.   
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Figure 3. Entropy-Infused Displays Presented to Rhesus Monkeys in Experiment 3 of 
Flemming, Beran, and Washburn, 2005.   
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However, when the S+ switched from same to different (or from different to 
same), all monkeys perseverated on their initially rewarded stimulus for thousands of 
trials. 
To give the monkeys a better indication of the S+, we introduced background 
color as a discriminative cue in Experiment 4. With the entropy of the displays increased 
(set size = 8), monkeys successfully discriminated between rows of identical and 
nonidentical images when accompanied by an S+ specific background color. When same 
was the designated S+, the background color was pink. A black background served as an 
indicator for an S+ of different. We hypothesized that these background colors functioned 
as referential labels for the rewarded stimulus. Gradually, the number of items in the 
displays was reduced to a pair, which now proved no more difficult than sets of 8. In 
contrast to Fagot, Wasserman, and Young’s (2001) work with baboons and Wasserman, 
Frank, and Young’s (2002) work with pigeons, we found that rhesus monkeys are 
capable of accurately making the distinction between pairs of identical and nonidentical 
images.  
Abstract Concepts and Language 
Premack (1976, 1983, 1986) suggested that, at least in the case of abstract 
relations, acquisition of conceptual knowledge depends upon language. Therefore, it 
should come as no surprise that while language-naïve nonhuman animals show varying  
degrees of perception-based conceptual knowledge, they lack the capacity to understand 
abstract concepts such as same and different to the same extent as humans understand 
them (Premack, 1983, 1986; Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 2000). 
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 Language has further been implicated as the main mechanism responsible for 
judgment of relations-between-relations—that is, second-order relations (Premack, 1976, 
1983; Premack & Premack, 2003; Thompson & Oden, 2000). 
Before Wasserman and colleagues demonstrated that pigeons and some baboons 
may have this ability (i.e., Fagot et al., 2001; Wasserman et al., 2002), only adult humans 
and language-trained chimpanzees had been shown to display abstract relational 
matching skills. Thompson, Oden, and Boysen (1997) revisited this accusation by 
presenting language-naïve chimpanzees with a conceptual matching-to-sample task. After 
being familiarized with a physical match-to-sample task, five adult chimpanzees viewed 
paired random junk objects as sample and choice stimuli. As in several previous tasks 
(i.e., Fagot et al., 2001), the goal was to indicate the choice pair that conveyed the same 
relation between the objects as the sample pair.   
Four of five chimpanzees spontaneously judged the conceptual equivalence of 
relations-between-relations. The fifth chimpanzee differed in his learning history; he was 
naïve with respect to numeric problem solving and symbolic token training in addition to 
language training. Therefore, it seems that these tokens may have a functional role in the 
acquisition of abstract concepts.  Thompson and Oden (1996) suggested that the critical 
role of the token is to provide an animal with a concrete icon for encoding a propositional 
representation that is otherwise abstract. In the context of abstract relational matching-to-
sample, the token may “objectify” a relationship or have the retrieval function of a word 
(Thompson et al., 1997). Thompson, Oden, and Boysen (1997) also suggested that 
conceptual-relational matching is akin to covert symbol matching. 
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Thompson and colleagues (1997) hypothesized that the judgment of relations-
between-relations is made possible by the animal’s representational capacity to re-encode 
abstract relations into iconically equivalent symbols. It should follow then, that such 
symbolic training produces a system for universal computation. 
By comparing directly three distinct primate species, differences in performance 
may reflect evolutionary change as a function of relatedness to a common primate 
ancestor. Because analogical reasoning cannot be reduced to stimulus-response (S-R) 
learning, it is reasonable to expect that, like emergent behaviors, we should note a 
qualitative shift in relation to cranial capacity (Rumbaugh, 2002). Because rhesus 
monkeys are more distantly related to humans than are chimpanzees, similarities in 
analogical reasoning skills may suggest that the phenomenon was in existence for a large 
part of primate evolutionary history. Chimpanzees diverged from the common primate 
ancestor more recently than rhesus monkeys, with respect to humans. Therefore, 
behaviors observed only in chimpanzees and humans, but not rhesus monkeys, may be a 
more recent development in cognitive evolution. 
The purpose of the current project was to determine the role of meaning in the 
analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Such comparisons outline 
further our understanding of the cognitive capacities of various species and further our 
knowledge about concepts and mechanisms of concepts learning in general. According to 
Thompson and colleagues (1997), the capacity to re-code abstract relations (such as 
same-different) is solely responsible for success in conceptual relational matching. Such a 
recoding would require animals to have an explicit symbol or token consistently 
associated with the abstract relations themselves. Perhaps, rather than a strict language 
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system, meaningfulness of stimuli plays the pivotal role in the acquisition of abstract 
concepts. According to this hypothesis, as long as meaning can be attributed to individual 
stimuli, nonhuman animals will begin to recognize pairs as matched or nonmatched in 
meaning, rather than perception.  
Method 
Participants 
Three groups of participants were tested on the analogical reasoning task: adult 
humans, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). 
Eighty-two undergraduates (67 females) were recruited from Georgia State 
University’s psychology research pool with half assigned to each stimulus condition 
(meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli) in the relational match-to-sample task. The 
mean age of the participants was 20 years and 60% were minority students. All 
participants completed an informed consent form and received debriefing instructions 
upon completion of the task.  
Four chimpanzees (18 to 34 years of age) housed at Georgia State University’s 
Language Research Center (LRC) were also tested. The chimpanzees had previously 
participated in experiments involving the simple match-to-sample paradigm with 
joysticks (Beran & Washburn, 2002), but were naïve to the specific testing procedures 
involving the S/D concepts. Individuals were randomly assigned to receive one of two 
conditions (meaningful and nonmeaningful lexigram stimuli) first, followed by 
completion of the remaining condition. The chimpanzees were not food or water 
deprived. Individuals worked at mobile testing systems at their home cages for 
designated 1-hour sessions each day. 
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 Five male rhesus monkeys (10 to 20 years of age) housed at the LRC also 
completed the relational match-to-sample task. Like the chimpanzees, the monkeys had 
been previously trained on simple physical match-to-sample tasks (MTS) with joysticks 
where correct responses were exact physical matches to target stimuli (Washburn et al., 
1992; Washburn & Astur, 1998). Individuals were randomly assigned to receive one of 
two conditions (meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli) first, followed by completion of 
the remaining condition. The monkeys were not food or water deprived for purposes of 
testing, and allowed to work ad libitum throughout the day in their home cages. 
All monkeys began this study with previous experience on other tasks involving 
the same-different paradigm. In the Flemming, Beran, and Washburn (2005) study, 
monkeys discriminated between arrays composed of identical or nonidentical clipart 
images. In the presence of a discriminative color cue, monkeys successfully 
discriminated same from different displays of 8, 6, 4, and 2 items. In addition, monkeys 
completed, but failed RMTS tasks similar to those in the current study, but composed 
only of clipart images. 
Apparatus 
The LRC’s Computerized Test System (LRC-CTS) consists of an IBM-
compatible desktop personal computer (Washburn et al., 1992). This same apparatus was 
used throughout all parts of the project, with slight variations for each species. 
Undergraduate students at Georgia State University were tested at a desktop computer 
using a hand-held joystick.  Each nonhuman animal had access to its own testing station.  
During tasks, monkeys controlled a cursor on a 17-inch SVGA monitor via a vertically-
mounted joystick. The monitor was positioned approximately 15 cm from the home cage 
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behind a transparent Lexan plate. Chimpanzees controlled a horizontally-mounted 
joystick within a port attached to their home cages; stimuli were presented on a monitor 
approximately 1m outside of the home cage on a mobile cart. 
Speakers provided auditory feedback for all tasks, including a low buzzing sound 
for incorrect choices and an increasing crescendo sound for correct choices. These sounds 
have been paired with these outcomes on many previous tasks.  For the current tasks, the 
increasing crescendo sound was always accompanied by the dispensing of a 94-mg 
banana-flavored pellet to rhesus monkeys and small portions of fruit or 1-g pellet to the 
chimpanzees.  
Design and Procedure 
 To investigate the role of meaning in the acquisition of abstract relational 
concepts in the proposed study, the three different species completed comparable tasks. 
Human adults, chimpanzees, and rhesus monkeys completed two relational match-to-
sample (RMTS) tasks that differ on one dimension. In one condition, the stimuli 
conveyed no meaning to the participant, whereas in the other condition, stimuli carried 
discreet, specific meanings. Participants completed both tasks in a randomized design, 
with some individuals receiving the meaningful condition first and others receiving the 
nonmeaningful condition first.  
Task 
 In the RMTS task, stimuli were presented in pairs with one sample pair and two 
choice pairs.  At the initiation of a trial, one pair of stimuli (either two identical or 
nonidentical objects) was centered at the top of the computer screen; stimuli were 
approximately 5 cm x 3 cm. Participants were required to contact this sample pair with 
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the stimuli in order for the choice pairs to appear. Once contact with the sample pair was 
made, the joystick cursor was re-centered on the screen, and the choice pairs appeared in 
the bottom half of the screen on the left and right sides. One choice pair contained two 
identical items, whereas the other contained two physically nonidentical items. 
Importantly, no stimulus in the choice pairs was ever physically identical to stimuli in the 
sample pair and was randomly assigned to position. The task, then, for example, was to 
match AA with BB (and not CD) and to match EF with GH (and not JJ).  Similar testing 
paradigms have been frequently utilized (Premack, 1976; Thompson & Oden, 2000; 
Flemming et al., 2005). Successful performance of the conceptual-relation matching task 
required that the participants judge one relation to be the same or different from another 
relation. 
To make a response, the cursor was moved either left or right toward the choice 
pairs. Once contact was made with a choice pair, a feedback sound was played (an 
increasing tone if the choice was correct or a buzzing if incorrect) followed by rewards 
on correct trials for nonhuman animals and a short intertrial interval (ITI) until the sample 
pair for the next trial appears.  For correct choices, rewards were automatically dispensed 
to the animals accompanied by a 2-s ITI.  When choices were incorrect, no food reward 
was dispensed and longer ITIs were imposed (15 s for rhesus monkeys and 5 s for 
chimpanzees). Humans, however, received instruction as to the meaning of the feedback 
sounds. This was the only instruction they received. In addition, humans received no food 
reward and 2-s ITIs for both correct and incorrect choices. After the ITI, the next trial 
was automatically initiated and the next sample pair appears at top of the screen. 
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Stimuli were selected from one of two separate conditions for each participant or 
animal: meaningful or nonmeaningful. In the meaningful condition, stimuli were discreet 
symbols that had meaning specific to the species.  
Stimuli 
Humans. Meaningful stimuli were composed of 3- to 7-letter words that referred 
to concrete objects such as foods and places.  Nonmeaningful stimuli were composed of 
3- to 7-letter strings of illegal nonwords generated by the program WordGen (Duyck, 
Desment, Verbeke & Brysbaert, 2004). Illegal nonwords were chosen as appropriate 
nonmeaningful stimuli because they carry with them no inherent referential value, and 
cannot be recoded into sensible phonemes in the English language. Both sets of stimuli 
appeared as white letters inside a black rectangle. Figure 4 portrays example displays 
presented to human participants.   
Chimpanzees. Lexigrams are symbolic characters that convey special meaning of 
real-world objects to the chimpanzees. Through specialized training, the animals learned 
to communicate with the researchers and one another about certain foods, places, people, 
and activities (Rumbaugh, 1977; Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, & Taglialatela, 2001; 
Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003).  The LRC chimpanzees 
have been shown to retain the meaning of these symbols for more than 20 years (Beran, 
Pate, Richardson, & Rumbaugh, 2000). In addition, the animals sort lexigrams into 
labeled groups more accurately than real-world objects and photographs (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1980). 
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Figure 4. Example Displays Presented to Human Participants  
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Only lexigrams with which the chimpanzees have had extensive experience and 
have been shown to retain meaning for the animals were presented during the meaningful 
condition. These lexigrams may function more like whole words for the animals carrying 
with them a specialized meaning (Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003). Exemplars from an 
unknown, never before seen subset of lexigrams were used as nonmeaningful for 
chimpanzees (see Figure 5).  
For the first two sessions (20 to 30 trials) animals were hand-fed with preferred 
fruits after the selection of correct choices. Because animals were distracted by 
experimenter presence, oftentimes not attending to the computer screen during trials, the 
automatic pellet dispenser was utilized throughout subsequent testing sessions. 
Monkeys. Although the rhesus monkeys had seen lexigram stimuli in previous 
studies, these animals had never been trained on lexigrams meanings. There is sufficient 
evidence however that monkeys can at least use symbols as labels for certain concepts. In 
tasks presented to the rhesus monkeys at the LRC, Arabic numerals have been paired 
with specific numbers of pellets, possibly allowing the animals to associate these numeric 
symbols with quantity information (Rumbaugh & Washburn, 1991; Washburn, 1994).  
In addition to simple quantity information that numerals may convey, Arabic 
numerals have also produced Stroop-like effects in rhesus monkeys at the LRC. Because 
meaning of the numerals interferes with judgments about amount, numerals mean 
amounts, and thus can be said to have symbolic representation for the monkeys 
(Washburn, 1994).  
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Figure 5. Example Displays Presented to Chimpanzees
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Adding to the repertoire of what Arabic numerals mean to the rhesus monkeys at 
the LRC is the predictive power of the numeric symbols. Harris & Washburn (2005) 
presented the monkeys with series of reinforced and nonreinforced maze trials in which 
Arabic numerals indicated the number of reinforced mazes that must be completed before 
a nonreinforced maze trial was presented. Monkeys developed a pattern of responding 
slower on nonreinforced trials than the preceding reinforced trial; they used the Arabic 
numeral as a cue to the number of reinforced maze trials that would occur in a series 
(Harris & Washburn, 2005). These previously learned Arabic numerals were utilized in 
paired stimuli in the meaningful condition (see Figure 6). 
In the nonmeaningful condition, stimuli consisted of basic Latin alphabet letters. 
Special attention was given so that letters used in previous tasks for specific choice 
responses were not included in the subset of letters used in this task. Choice of letters and 
numerals controlled for perceptual qualities of the stimuli by balancing their basic 
physical properties. 
Results 
Humans  
 Accuracy-by-condition was assessed by comparing the average performance for 
the entire 100-trial block between the two groups of participants (meaningful/ 
nonmeaningful). Participants in the meaningful condition completed the task with an 
average accuracy of 93.86 out of 100 trials (SE = 1.73), significantly higher than 
participants in the nonmeaningful condition (M = 87.48, SE = 2.47); t(80) = 2.13, p < .05, 
d = 6.38.  
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Figure 6. Example Displays Presented to Rhesus Monkeys 
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Within a 100-trial testing session of either the meaningful or nonmeaningful 
stimuli, 76 of 82 participants met the criterion (correct responses to 8 out of the previous 
10 trials attempted) for sufficient acquisition of an analogical rule. Two participants who 
received the meaningful condition never met a criterial level of accuracy; four 
participants assigned to the nonmeaningful condition did not perform at levels 
significantly above chance (50%) after 100 trials. These six participants were removed 
from analysis for trials-to-criterion and response time. 
Because accuracy was generally high for participants in both conditions, the 
number of trials-to-criterion was assessed to determine how long participants failed 
before realizing the analogical rule. Trials-to-criterion for each participant was calculated 
by summing the total number of trials until eight out of the previous ten trials attempted 
were completed correctly. Participants in the meaningful condition met criterion on 
average within 14.35 trials (SE = 1.38), fewer than the number of trials required for the 
participants in the nonmeaningful condition (M = 19.08; SE = 2.60); however, this 
difference was not statistically significant, t(74) = 1.65, p = .10, d = 4.73 (see Figure 7).  
Response time (time from the appearance of the choice pairs to the selection of 
one choice) provides another measure of learning by assessing how long participants 
process the stimuli before making a choice. A mixed-design ANOVA revealed a 
significant within-subjects main effect (RT before/RT after), but no significant interaction 
with the between-subjects factor (meaningful/nonmeaningful). In both conditions, 
response time was significantly shorter after criterion was met, F(1,74) = 61.64, p < .01 
(see Figure 8). 
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Figure 7.  Number of Trials to Reach Criterion for Human Participants (error bars 
represent standard error) 
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Figure 8. Response Times Pre- and Post-Acquisition for Human Participants (error bars 
represent standard error) 
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Response times both before (RT before) and after (RT after) meeting criterion were 
statistically equivalent for both conditions, F(1,74) = 0.88, p = .35.  
Chimpanzees 
 There were individual differences in performance by the chimpanzees on the 
RMTS task. Table 1 presents performance summaries for the chimpanzees. Two 
chimpanzees (Lana and Mercury) never performed significantly above chance in any 
condition—meaningful (lexigrams or numerals) or nonmeaningful—after at least 110 
trials in each condition. 
In several testing sessions, these animals developed positional biases, choosing 
either the left or right stimulus exclusively for a significant number of trials.  Mercury 
(who received the nonmeaningful condition first) contacted the left pair on 81% of all 
trials in the numeral condition, significantly more often than the right pair z = 6.48, p < 
.01. In meaningful and nonmeaningful conditions, however, Mercury developed strong 
right-side biases: 76%, z = 7.16, p < .01 for meaningful trials; 66%, z = 3.73, p < .01 for 
nonmeaningful trials. To illustrate that performance did not improve across trials, Figure 
9 presents Mercury’s cumulative percentage of correct responses per trial block in the 
three conditions.  
 Performance was found to be symmetric in all conditions for Mercury. That is, 
accuracy on same trials and different trials was statistically equivalent across conditions 
“meaningful” lexigrams χ2 (1, 191) = .09, p > .05; nonmeaningful lexigrams χ2 (1, 133) = 
.81, p > .05; meaningful (numerals χ2 (1, 110) = .003, p > .05).  
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Table 1.  
Performance summaries of chimpanzees 
 
Subject Condition  # of Trials Completed  Percent Correct
Lana  Meaningful (lexigrams) 238    52 
  Nonmeaningful  166    54 
  Meaningful (numerals) 342    52 
 
Mercury Meaningful (lexigrams) 191    49 
  Nonmeaningful  133    56 
  Meaningful (numerals) 110    48 
 
Panzee  Meaningful (lexigrams) 202    66* 
  Nonmeaningful  186    54 
  Meaningful (numerals) 286    44 
 
Sherman Meaningful (lexigrams) 227    55 
  Nonmeaningful  263    65*   
  Meaningful (numerals) 166    54 
* p < 0.05 
Note. Number of trials for each individual and condition varies as a result of how many 
trials each chimpanzee was able to complete in a given testing session. These data 
represent approximately 12 sessions per animal over the span of 21 weeks of testing. 
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Figure 9. Percent Correct by 10-Trial Block for Mercury. The solid horizontal line at 50% 
represents chance performance. 
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Lana (who received the meaningful-lexigrams condition first) also developed a 
similar side bias with the meaningful lexigrams, selecting the right stimulus pair in 68% 
of all trials, z = 5.70, p < .01. In the nonmeaningful condition, however, Lana developed a 
left side bias (68%) in the first 100 trials (z = 3.60, p < .01), and then shifted strategies to 
a right bias (67%) in the remaining 66 trials (z = 2.71, p < .01). To illustrate that 
performance did not improve across trials, Figure 10 presents Lana’s accuracy per trial 
block in the three conditions.  
Performance was found to be symmetric in all conditions for Lana. Accuracy on 
same trials and different trials was statistically equivalent for meaningful lexigrams χ2 (1, 
238) = .96, p > .05; nonmeaningful lexigrams χ2 (1, 166) = .24, p > .05; and for 
meaningful numerals χ2 (1, 342) = 1.78, p > .05). 
Panzee completed trials with meaningful stimuli before receiving the 
nonmeaningful and numeral conditions. She performed at levels above chance in the 
meaningful condition completing 66% of 202 trials correctly, z = 4.64, p < .01, but failed 
to perform above chance levels in the nonmeaningful and numeral conditions. Figure 11 
presents Panzee’s percentage of correct responses as a function of trial block and the 
three conditions.  
Distribution of accuracy varied by condition for Panzee. Accuracy on same trials 
and different trials was statistically equivalent for meaningful conditions: lexigrams χ2 (1, 
202) = 2.06, p > .05; numerals χ2 (1, 286) = 2.04, p > .05. In the nonmeaningful condition 
(which yielded overall chance performance), accuracy was significantly higher on 
different trials (65%) than on same trials (49%), χ2 (1, 186) = 4.61, p < .05. 
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Figure 10. Percent Correct by 10-Trial Block for Lana The solid horizontal line at 50% 
represents chance performance 
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Figure 11. Percent Correct by 10-Trial Block for Panzee. The solid horizontal line at 50% 
represents chance performance 
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Sherman completed trials with nonmeaningful stimuli before receiving the 
meaningful and number conditions. He performed at levels above chance in the 
nonmeaningful condition, completing 65.00% of 263 trials correctly, z = 4.99, p < 0.01; 
but he failed to reach significance in the meaningful conditions. Figure 12 presents 
Sherman’s percentage of correct responses as a function of trial block and the three 
conditions. 
Distribution of accuracy varied by condition for Sherman. Accuracy on same 
trials and different trials was statistically equivalent for meaningful conditions: lexigrams 
χ2 (1, 227) = 0.48, p > .05; numerals χ2 (1, 166) = 1.45, p > .05. In the nonmeaningful 
condition accuracy was significantly higher on different trials (80.6%) than on same trials 
(50%), χ2 (1, 263) = 27.18, p > .05. 
For each chimpanzee, accuracy levels were consistent across all trials. No 
significant increases in performance across time were observed; no performance plateau 
was reached until the last few trials completed. In instances where performance failed to 
reach significance, levels of accuracy remained around chance throughout the testing 
period. For those instances where chimpanzees did perform above chance levels, 
acquisition was spontaneous, rather than resembling gradual learning across trials. 
Rhesus Monkeys 
Order of presentation for the two conditions, meaningful and nonmeaningful was 
counterbalanced with three monkeys receiving nonmeaningful stimuli (letters) first and 
the other two monkeys receiving meaningful stimuli (numerals) first.  
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Figure 12. Percent Correct by 10-Trial Block for Sherman The solid horizontal line at 
50% represents chance performance 
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The monkeys completed an average of 1,937 trials in each condition, but no 
monkey achieved levels of performance significantly above chance on either condition, 
regardless of which was presented first. Performance summaries of the rhesus monkeys 
are shown in Table 2, with illustrative accuracy levels displayed in Figure 13 for Hank. 
The trends of the learning curves presented in Figure 13 are representative of the 
performance of all other monkeys in this study. Performance failed to improve across 
trials, and position biases emerged for every animal and condition. 
If performance gradually improved across trials, eventually approaching 
significance, we could conclude that the animals slowly learned an analogical rule 
through trial-and-error. This is not the case, as no animal ever reached a level of 
performance significantly different from chance. To illustrate that there is no evidence 
that performance did not improve across trials, blocks of 100 trials were analyzed 
independently for Hank for the first 1,000 trials in both conditions.  
Percent correct was not significantly different from chance in any trial block 
except for trials 601-700 (60% correct; z = 2.0, p < 0.05) in the nonmeaningful condition. 
Subsequent trial blocks rebounded to near chance performance. Table 3 summarizes these 
data. 
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Table 2. 
Performance Summaries of the Rhesus Monkeys 
 
 
Subject Condition  Trials Completed  % Correct z
Murph  Meaningful   2,766  50  .99  
  Nonmeaningful  779  48  .61 
Lou  Meaningful   1,826  51  .94  
  Nonmeaningful  3,599  48  -2.15* 
Willie  Meaningful   3,242  50  .21 
  Nonmeaningful  1,100  48  -.78 
Gale  Meaningful   1,306  49  -.44 
  Nonmeaningful  1,174  47  -1.40 
Hank  Meaningful   2,400  50  .08 
  Nonmeaningful  1,178  52  1.75 
* p < 0.05 
Note. Number of trials for each individual and condition varies as a result of how many 
trials each monkey was able to complete in a given testing session. These data represent 
approximately ten sessions over the span of two weeks. 
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Figure 13. Percent Correct by 100-Trial Block for Hank
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Table 3. 
Analysis by 100-Trial Blocks for Hank 
 
  
           Meaningful                 Nonmeaningful
   % correct    z   % correct   z 
1-100        46  -0.8        53  0.6 
101-200       43  -1.4        54  0.8 
201-300       57  1.4        50  0.0 
301-400       42  -1.6        50  0.0 
401-500       54  0.8        59  1.8 
501-600       53  0.6        49  -0.2 
601-700       53  0.6        60  2.0* 
701-800       43  -1.4        56  1.2 
801-900       53  0.6        45  -1.0 
901-1000       56  1.2        42  -1.6 
* p <0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 54
All but one monkey completed same and different trials with equivalent levels of 
accuracy in every condition; their treatment of same and different trials was symmetric 
(Murph-numerals χ2 (1, 2766) = .92, p > .05; Murph-letters χ2 (1, 779) = .24, p > .05; 
Lou-numerals χ2 (1, 1826) = .07, p > .05; Lou-letters χ2 (1, 3599) = .03, p > .05; Willie-
numerals χ2 (1, 3242) = .87, p > .05; Willie-letters χ2 (1, 1100) = .05, p > .05; Gale-
numerals χ2 (1, 1306) = .23, p > .05; Gale-letters χ2 (1, 1174) = 2.43, p > .05; Hank-
numerals χ2 (1, 2399) = 2.12, p > .05). In the nonmeaningful condition, Hank completed 
same trials (56.12%) with significantly greater accuracy than different trials (48.70%) (χ2 
(1, 1178) = 6.60, p > .05).  
As with the chimpanzees, positional biases also tended to shift between conditions 
for each animal. For instance, if the animal developed a right bias in the nonmeaningful 
condition, in the subsequent meaningful condition, a left-side bias emerged. After 
prolonged failure, all side biases were evident within the first 500 trials. Table 4 
summarizes position biases observed for rhesus monkeys. 
 
Discussion 
Humans 
For human participants, the known, discrete meaning of stimuli appeared to 
facilitate the acquisition of an analogical rule. Although performance was generally high 
across conditions, participants in the meaningful condition performed at significantly 
higher rates of accuracy than those in the nonmeaningful condition. For those participants 
in the meaningful condition, the analogical rule was also learned in fewer trials, albeit 
this difference was not statistically significant.  
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Table 4. 
Position Biases During First 500 Trials for Rhesus Monkeys 
 
 
Subject Condition  Side Biased % Biased     z  
Murph  Meaningful       Left     74  24.79* 
  Nonmeaningful     Right    88  21.67* 
Lou  Meaningful       Left     94  40.99* 
  Nonmeaningful     Right    97  56.89* 
Willie  Meaningful       Left     92  47.91* 
  Nonmeaningful     Right    92  27.68* 
Gale  Meaningful       Left     76  18.54* 
  Nonmeaningful     Right    81  21.30* 
Hank  Meaningful       Left     87  36.66* 
  Nonmeaningful     Right    75  16.96* 
* p <0.01 
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Response times, although significantly shorter after criterion was met, did not illustrate 
any effect meaningful stimuli. Differences in response time pre- and post-acquisition may 
reflect a practice effect as a result of increased joystick familiarity over time. Whereas 
this may be a confound of the measure, a more parsimonious explanation is that 
participants spent more time examining stimuli and attempting to determine the rule on 
trials before criterion was achieved. 
The representational value of each stimulus enabled the relational concepts of 
sameness and difference to be more salient to the participants in the meaningful condition 
than those who completed the task with (nonmeaningful) stimuli that had no inherent 
representational value. The discrete meaningful value of a stimulus not only enhances its 
own uniqueness, but may also remove associations it may have to the stimulus with 
which it is paired. For instance, the word “apple” always has the same representational 
value, but did not always appear paired with the word “carrot” that has its own distinct 
meaning. This dual role for meaning may allow for relational information about a pair of 
stimuli to emerge as the salient overall stimulus quality in fewer trials than if specific 
perceptual dimensions of a stimulus must be closely attended to on each trial. 
 It is interesting that some people failed to learn the analogical rule under any 
condition. On their de-briefing forms, these participants noted that they simply “never 
figured it out” or “tried to match similar things, but that didn’t work.” Therefore, 
relational similarities and differences never became salient as part of a rule-learning 
strategy. Like children, (Gentner, 1988) they may have been distracted by the surface 
similarities between the components of one trial. Whereas failure to learn the analogical 
rule may have been due to differences in motivation to participate, it is likely that if 
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structural similarities (i.e., the matching rule) were disclosed to the participants at the 
beginning of the experiment, success would be imminent.  
Chimpanzees 
 One chimpanzee showed above chance performance on the ago relational s/d task, 
but only in the meaningful-lexigram condition. A second chimpanzee also performed at 
levels above chance, but in the opposite condition (nonmeaningful-lexigram). Individual 
differences in performance by the chimpanzees may have arisen for a variety of reasons: 
the individual does not have the capacity for analogical reasoning, the representational 
value of the lexigram (or numeral) is not strong enough to differentiate it and allow for 
the emergence of a relational rule for the individual, or the representational  
value of the meaningful stimuli was so strong that the animal did not have the ability to 
overcome its inherent value and recognize relational information within a pair of these 
meaningful stimuli.  In addition, asymmetric effects on same versus different trials may 
reflect an inflexibly acquired rule. Asymmetric effects are an indication that half of the 
analogical rule is understood, but that the opposite of that rule may not also hold true. 
 For Lana and Mercury, whose performance did not differ significantly from 
chance in any condition, meaning most likely did not function to make the stimuli 
discrete entities, but rather the pairing of stimuli functioned only as a set without 
independent constituent parts. Because these animals were not able to extract relational 
information from the sample pair, completing the analogical problem correctly was 
impossible. 
 Panzee, who successfully completed only trials in the meaningful condition, and 
not nonmeaningful or number, seems dependent on the meaningfulness of stimuli in 
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order to match the choice relation to the sample. One should note that whereas this 
difference between meaningful (lexigrams) and nonmeaningful conditions is significant, 
an accuracy of 66% for the meaningful (lexigram) condition is less convincing than a 
criterion of 80% or better that is typically regarded as evidence for task acquisition (e.g., 
Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Cook, Cavoto, & Cavoto, 1995; Wasserman et al., 2002; Young 
& Wasserman, 2002). Rather than facilitating the acquisition of the analogical rule, one 
chimpanzee failed to acquire the analogical rule at all unless the stimuli have discreet 
meaning. Even after completing the meaningful sessions first, Panzee failed to perform 
above levels of chance during nonmeaningful and number sessions. This would indicate 
that what she learned during the meaningful sessions was not a general overarching 
analogical rule as we might conceive it. If that were the case, she should have transferred 
her knowledge from the first condition (meaningful) to the next conditions presented. 
Rather, it is possible that she viewed the nonmeaningful and numeral conditions as 
completely novel tasks that she had to learn. Alternatively, the analogical rule that she 
learned may be specific to those stimuli with external representation and thus the rule 
could not be applied in instances in which meaningful symbols are not present. However, 
by this logic, she should have been able correctly to complete trials with Arabic numerals 
present. That she did not perform above levels of chance with these stimuli either may 
indicate that Arabic numerals may not represented in as concrete a way that objects such 
as foods and places are (i.e., representation as estimates; see Beran, 2004) . Perhaps her 
analogical rule applied in a rather limited way only to symbols for specific, exactly-
defined objects. 
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 Sherman responded in a manner opposite to Panzee. He completed trials only in 
the nonmeaningful condition above levels of chance. Again, whereas this difference 
between meaningful (lexigrams) and nonmeaningful conditions is significant, an 
accuracy of 65% in the nonmeaningful condition does not represent a very strong effect. 
Rather than assisting his acquisition of an analogical rule, meaning may act as a 
confusing factor for Sherman. That he could correctly complete only nonmeaningful 
trials may indicate that his analogical rule was more perceptually than symbolically 
based. Perhaps he attended more specifically to the perceptual qualities of a stimulus in 
order to determine its relatedness to another within the pair. In the meaningful and 
number conditions, it may be the case that when a meaningful stimulus was present, 
Sherman did not look past the specific meaning associated with it in order to search for 
relational information. Rather, Sherman may search only for stimuli that match in their 
meaning and not in their relational value. For both Panzee and Sherman, poor 
performance on subsequent conditions may be indicative of the inflexibility of their 
application of the analogical rule.  
 Asymmetric performance by Sherman on different trials in comparison to same 
trials in the nonmeaningful condition indicates that the analogical rule acquired applied 
only to differently related pairs of items. Rather than using the rule to match relations 
flexibly across trial types, asymmetric performance indicates that the strategy used was 
not fully developed so that a consistent rule could be applied to same relations. 
Both pigeons and people are predisposed to notice differences as well as 
similarities (Fagot et al., 2001; Young & Wasserman, 2002). Like pigeons and people, 
chimpanzees exhibit some differences in performance on same versus different trials. If 
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we suppose that chimpanzees are predisposed to noticing only differences, it is likely that 
(at least for Sherman) an analogical rule was realized only through experience matching 
differently related pairs with other differently related pairs. In subsequent trials, when 
similarly related pairs were presenting, the limited analogical rule that he learned no 
longer applied.  
Monkeys 
Failure to match relational pairs correctly in this task could be the result of one or 
more of a variety of reasons: the monkeys cannot extract the necessary relational 
information from a pair of objects, relational knowledge is not encoded such that it is 
accessible for application to novel behaviors, or perceptual properties of stimuli can not 
be ignored in a matching paradigm.  
 From their performance on previous tasks (e.g., Flemming et al., 2005), we know 
that monkeys can extract relational information from a pair of objects. In a two-choice 
discrimination paradigm, monkeys chose either a pair of identical or nonidentical objects 
in the presence of a discriminative cue. It may be the case that the monkey’s ability to 
extract relational information is reliant on a discriminative cue; the discriminative cue 
prompts the search for relational information present in the given sample. In the current 
task, no discriminative cue was offered, perhaps not enabling the search for a relation 
between the items in the pair. 
 Whereas monkeys possess the ability to extract relational information from a pair 
of items in certain testing instances, they fail to express this type of knowledge in a 
relational match-to-sample (MTS) paradigm. Their history with the MTS paradigm may 
be so closely tied the task to the search for perceptual similarities amongst presented 
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items that requesting a different rule (the search for relational similarities) is 
unreasonable to expect. When pairs of items are presented, and no choice pair includes 
similar perceptual qualities, monkeys may be inflexible in their quest for a new rule to 
impose on the seemingly familiar task.  
 Relational matching may not be beyond the capability of rhesus monkeys or some 
chimpanzees, but it would seem that relational information is certainly not as salient as it 
seems to be for humans. Presenting the task in a slightly modified paradigm could make 
more salient the relational information to be utilized in the task. One plausible variation 
could present each stimulus individually and successively, forcing attention first to the 
uniqueness of each item composing the pair, followed by combined attention to the pair 
itself. In addition, removal of the sample pair before choice pair presentation can reduce 
visual complexity on the screen. If the sample pair is removed from the screen, the search 
for a perceptually identical match can be diminished. In this new task variation, attention 
to the pairs as a grouping of two objects rather than a conglomerate, and a diversion from 
perceptual matching are achieved. 
 
General Discussion 
 Robust differences in performance emerged across species in this analogical 
reasoning task. Not only did human participants outperform chimpanzees and monkeys, 
but the role of meaning when completing an analogy was also dissimilar across species. 
According to these data, stimuli with representational value can facilitate, hinder, or have 
no effect on the completion of an analogy of same and different objects.  
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 Taken together, the results of this comparative study both lend support and 
opposition to the previous suggestion that language-like abilities and symbolic training 
are integral to the capacity of analogical reasoning. As was discussed above, Premack 
(1983) concluded that language-like training is necessary based on his experiments with 
Sarah, a chimpanzee. Similarly, Thompson et al. (1997) posited that labeling of relational 
information is a necessary component of analogical thinking. Whereas the results of the 
current study do not allow for the conclusion that human and chimpanzee participants 
were labeling the related pairs of stimuli, individual differences which arose between the 
chimpanzees urge the consideration of an alternate hypothesis. With extensive lexical 
vocabularies, three of the four chimpanzees that participated in this study have the 
capacity to label items, and by Thompson and colleagues’ (1997) logic should possess the 
ability to conceptualize relations-between-relations. One chimpanzee was not able to do 
so in any of three conditions (meaningful, nonmeaningful, and number). One chimpanzee 
was able to complete the task only when individual stimuli afforded external 
representation (meaningful); still another chimpanzee successfully completed the task 
only when stimuli were unfamiliar and nonmeaningful. These differences in performance 
suggest one of three alternate hypotheses related to labeling: labeling of relations is 
dependent upon different stimulus qualities for different individuals, labels must exist for 
specific same and different terms, or labeling plays no role in analogical reasoning.  
Whereas one chimpanzee has a lexical vocabulary and can certainly label external 
objects with corresponding lexigrams, above chance performance on the analogical 
reasoning task would be expected, but was not observed. This poor performance may 
mean that labeling, if in fact occurring during the task, plays no role in the acquisition of 
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an analogical rule. Another possibility, though, is that labeling of relational information is 
not made more salient than the overt object labels (of individual stimuli) themselves. That 
is, meaning of individual stimuli confounds the labeling of the related pair for this 
individual. This could also be the case for the chimpanzee that correctly completed trials 
in the nonmeaningful condition, but not in meaningful or number. Perhaps after correctly 
completing trials in the nonmeaningful condition (either with or without succinct labels 
or re-coding terms of relatedness), this individual had used labels that were specific to 
physical similarities between stimuli to recode the pair. In the meaningful condition, 
identity pairs are physical matches in addition to their matched meaning. Perhaps when 
representational value for specific external objects is present, that meaning becomes the 
default dimension of salience, rather than allowing for the search of abstract labels that 
are not overtly present, but must be created by attending only to the relatedness of 
stimuli. 
The numeral condition carried out with the chimpanzees deserves special 
consideration. Numerical studies with the chimpanzees (e.g. Beran, 2004) suggest that 
Arabic numerals, like lexigrams, carry with them some type of representational value. 
How these numerals are represented is yet undetermined. Rather than concrete quantity 
information, it is likely that these Arabic numerals represent a vague estimate of a 
number of items (Beran, 2004).  For this reason, although they are meaningful, they 
should not be placed on a level of representational capacity equal to lexigrams. 
Lexigrams are symbols that are used on a daily basis to reference specific people, places, 
objects, and foods. Numerals, however, are used only in a small percentage of cognitive 
tasks, and are not spontaneously used by the chimpanzees to reference, for example, 
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“how many” of an item they would like to obtain. Therefore, their concept of number, 
aside from the little experimenters know about it, is surely less broad than the knowledge 
the chimpanzees have of the concrete objects they commonly reference with lexigrams. 
What Analogies Mean for the S/D Concept 
 The relational matching paradigm utilized throughout this study tests analogical 
reasoning skills by forcing explicit expression of conceptual knowledge for same and 
differently related pairs. Thus, analogy completion assumes (and relies on) conceptual 
knowledge of same and different. Certainly, human participants in this study have a very 
broad conception of same and different, as humans regularly classify objects into groups 
based on similarities and differences. Perhaps our propensity to do so is driven by the 
salience of relations. Whereas it is clear that other animals have the capacity to perceive 
the relations of same and different (Bovet & Vauclair, 2001; Cook et al., 1995; Flemming 
et al. 2005; Katz et al., 2002; Wasserman et al., 2002), the acquisition of these concepts 
for birds and monkeys does not emerge for sometimes hundreds of trials. Human 
participants as young as 3 years old have provided evidence that the identity/nonidentity 
concept emerges in significantly fewer trials (Gentner & Markman, 1997).  
Because the concepts of same and different are not as salient to nonhuman 
primates as they are to humans, their use when searching for an already abstract matching 
rule (in RMTS) is not as readily available a strategy. Pigeons and monkeys which have 
been shown in some studies to rely on arrays of multiple items in order to glean relational 
information (e.g., Wasserman et al., 2002) may rely on more ecological valid strategies 
(i.e., colors and shapes) when presented with a matching to sample task. Unlike simple 
discriminations that rely only on implicit types of conceptual knowledge, the analogical 
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paradigm carried throughout this study requires the explicit use of the same/different 
strategy. In sum, because the same/different concept is less salient and possibly more 
narrowly conceived for nonhuman primates, it stands to reason that the application of the 
concept would be more difficult for such an animal. 
Species Differences: Why Analogies Are Difficult Even for Us 
Application of analogical reasoning sometimes can occur spontaneously for 
humans, rather than explicitly being told to use an analogy in order to solve a problem 
(Dunbar, 2001). In most scenarios, like standardized tests, we are instructed explicitly to 
think of the problem in terms of relationships and that analogical reasoning should be 
applied. This type of instruction is impossible to deliver to a nonhuman primate. That the 
chimpanzees in this study complete the problem at all (without explicit instruction) is 
impressive. 
When the similarities between old and new problems are surface, (e.g., using the 
same elements) analogical reasoning is more quickly applied to the new problem. Rather, 
if the similarities between previous experiences and novel problems are only structural 
(e.g. content) in nature, application of analogical reasoning skills is far less obvious and 
therefore not as salient a strategy. 
In experiments with children and adult humans, researchers agree that surface 
similarities are the key to whether participants will think of using an analogy to solve a 
problem when not explicitly told to do so (Catrambone, 2002; Gentner, Rattermann, & 
Forbes, 1993). In addition, human participants are particularly distracted by surface 
similarities in analogous problems, even when they are unimportant (Ross, 1987). 
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In the current study, only structural similarities exist across trials. Surface 
similarities in the current paradigm would only exist if individual stimuli were 
consistently arranged across trials. The repeated presentation of individual stimuli (albeit 
in various locations and combinations of pairings) could be interpreted as surface 
similarities which act as confounds not related to the application of analogical 
knowledge. If stimulus A is present in the sample pair, not only may the subject attempt 
to search for stimulus A amongst the choice pairs, but they may also retain knowledge of 
the role of stimulus A for future trials. Thus, if stimulus A is encountered again, 
regardless of current location or pairing, rules previously associated with it may be 
incorrectly applied to the current scenario. 
Children as old as 11 years old often have difficulties in their analogical reasoning 
abilities. Rather than responding on the basis of relational similarities, thematic- and 
object-similarity choices are often are more salient to children (Rattermann & Gentner, 
1998). Later in development, most children successfully solve analogical reasoning 
noting relational similarities and differences. For this reason, there is likely a shift 
whereby children interpret analogy only in terms of object similarity and then in terms of 
relational similarity (Gentner, 1988; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998). 
 In sum, the present study uncovers both common threads and disparities in the 
analogical reasoning skills of members of the primate lineage. Whereas meaningful 
stimuli act as facilitators for humans in making more salient the relational information 
presented and consequently the nature of an analogical rule, meaning can take on various 
roles for other primate species. Representational value can take on the role of both 
enabling and inhibiting analogy completion for chimpanzees, and seems to have no 
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facillatory role at all for rhesus monkeys. These different roles may reflect the different 
ways that nonhuman primates represent their worlds. Despite the ambiguity of the exact 
mechanism by which analogies are realized, the present experiment provides the first 
parallel comparison of the acquisition of an analogical rule across three species of 
primates. 
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